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ABSTRACT. This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of 
sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform 
efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international 
movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in 
order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One 
especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts 
has drawn on empirical data regarding implicit biases and their effects. Here, we 
address two concerns about these empirical data. First, critics have for some 
time argued that the studies drawn upon cannot give us an accurate picture of 
the workings of prejudice, because they ignore the intersectional nature of these 
phenomena. More recently, concerns have been raised about the empirical data 
supporting the nature and existence of implicit bias. Each of these concerns, but 
perhaps more commonly the latter, are thought by some to undermine reform 
efforts in philosophy. In this paper, we take a three-pronged approach to these 
claims. First, we show that the reforms can be motivated quite independently of 
the implicit bias data, and that many of these reforms are in fact very well suited 
to dealing with intersectional worries. Next, we show that in fact the empirical 
concerns about the implicit bias data are not nearly as problematic as some have 
thought. Finally, we argue that while the intersectional concerns are an 
immensely valuable criticism of early work on implicit bias, more recent work is 
starting to address these worries. 
 
In recent years, there has been increasing attention in philosophy to issues of 
underrepresentation and of hostile and unwelcoming climates for members of 




growing literature on this topic, there have been many initiatives designed to bring about 
change: the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers; Minorities and Philosophy; the 
blog What is it Like to be a Woman in Philosophy; the Gendered Conference Campaign; 
good practice guidance from the British Philosophical Association, the American 
Philosophical Association, and the Canadian Philosophical Association; the Site Visit 
Program of the American Philosophical Association; and so on. More and more 
departments and associations are setting up committees to reflect on and improve their 
practices, and more and more reforms designed to foster inclusion are being put in 
place. 
 One of the key justifications that has been used to argue for this attention, and for 
the reforms, has been empirical data on implicit bias.1 Although this has been far from 
the only justification, it has received a large share of the attention—perhaps because 
this period has coincided with one in which implicit bias has been a burgeoning 
research topic in philosophy. However, the research from empirical psychology on 
implicit bias is far from uncontroversial. While indirect measures that are taken to 
access implicit bias have repeatedly shown patterns of bias in large samples, some 
concerns have been raised about whether this field of research yields adequate 
understandings to motivate reforms. First, worries have been raised about whether the 
research uses reliable tools to access mental constructs. Second, worries have been 
raised about whether whatever is measured by these empirical tools is a good predictor 
of behavior. Third, concerns have been raised about whether interventions to change 
implicit bias are the right place to focus our efforts. Moreover, concerns have been 
                                                 
1 This has also been the case with respect to reforms outside of academia. To the extent that implicit bias 
has been relied upon to justify similar reforms in other contexts, the argument of our paper could be 




raised about the ability of research on implicit bias to address intersectional 
oppressions. 
 These concerns have been seized upon as evidence that reform efforts in 
philosophy are unmotivated or misguided, and have provided fuel for a backlash against 
efforts to diversify the profession (see e.g., Hermanson 2017, and countless online 
discussions). 
 In this paper, we first argue that reform efforts in philosophy are multiply motivated. 
Nearly all of these remain very well justified quite independently of results regarding 
implicit bias. The only ones that would be undermined are highly specific ones aimed 
exclusively at implicit bias, which have in general been some of the least widely adopted 
ones. So whatever is the case regarding implicit bias, philosophical reform efforts are 
far from misguided. Next, however, we demonstrate that there is no good reason to be 
so dismissive of justifications of reform efforts in terms of implicit bias—the data have 
not, after all, undermined these. They have shown that some particular claims made 
about implicit bias (including some of those occasionally made by one of us in the past) 
are in need of more careful phrasing. But this more careful phrasing does not 
undermine the justification for reforms. As we discuss reform efforts, we address 
whether they are able to take proper account of the intersectional nature of oppression; 
and we also show that empirical studies of implicit bias can, and increasingly do, take 
account of intersectionality. 
 
1. UNDERREPRESENTATION/MARGINALIZATION IN PHILOSOPHY2 
                                                 
2 A group needn’t be underrepresented to be marginalized. Take, for example the case of LGBTQ+ 
philosophers, who may well—we don’t know—not be underrepresented in philosophy, relative to the 
population. Even if this were so, they may still be marginalized, and so an appropriate focus of concern 





In recent years, there has been an increasingly widespread recognition that philosophy 
is very white, male, middle class, and in countless other ways less diverse than it could 
be—and less diverse than many other fields, both in the Arts and Humanities and in the 
STEM subjects in which there has for some time been attention to issues of 
underrepresentation. According to our most recent data, women are 17 percent of full-
time professional philosophers (where this does not include students) in the US 
(Norlock 2011), 24 percent in the UK (Beebee and Saul 2011), and 31 percent in 
Canada (Doucet and Beaulac 2013). But women are neither the only underrepresented 
group in philosophy nor the most underrepresented group. According to Botts et al. 
(2014), black PhD students and professional philosophers combined are just 1.32 
percent of philosophers in the US. 
 The lack of diversity in philosophy varies across career stages and type of 
underrepresentation, and this variation in turn is affected by country. In the UK, women 
and men enter as undergraduate philosophy students in close to equal numbers 
(Beebee and Saul 2011), with a substantial drop-off at MA level, and further drops at 
subsequent stages. In the US, on the other hand, the largest drop-off point is at the 
point of deciding to major in philosophy (Paxton et al. 2012). A 2017 post by Eric 
Schwitzgebel based on data from the National Center for Education Statistics database 
found that Latino/Hispanic students and Asian undergraduate students were 
represented in philosophy at numbers comparable to their numbers in the population of 
undergraduates (as Schwitzgebel notes, Latinos/Hispanics are substantially 
underrepresented in the undergraduate population), but that blacks were substantially 




percent in the wider student population).3 Botts et al.’s 2014 study of blacks in 
philosophy in the US suggests that this drops to less than 1 percent at PhD (2014, 237). 
Botts et al. found that there were 141 black people who were either employed by or PhD 
students in US philosophy departments; 35 percent of whom were women. Interestingly, 
Botts et al. also found that about half of black PhD students were women, a much 
higher percentage than among PhD students overall. A report by MAP4 found that 
between 1995 and 2014, the percentage of undergraduate philosophy degrees awarded 
to members of traditionally underrepresented racial and ethnic groups rose from 9 
percent to 17 percent; the percentage of master’s degrees rose from 6.5 percent to 10 
percent; and the percentage of PhD degrees from 2.7 percent to 8 percent. There have 
been particularly significant rises in the percentage of Hispanic students.5 We don’t 
have good data on the underrepresentation of disabled people, working-class people, or 
LGBTQ+ people. 
 We know, then, that philosophy is much less diverse than it would be if it were 
representative of the population (or even of the relevant university population, whether 
student or staff). We also know that there are many different and overlapping groups 
that are underrepresented, and that there are undoubtedly a variety of differing causes 
for the underrepresentation. Further, we know that—leaving aside issues of 
underrepresentation—members of marginalized groups report experiencing a hostile 











environment in philosophy.6 Most of those who work on these issues are convinced that 
a wide range of causes are at work—some historical, some psychological, and some 
structural. A very plausible explanation is that something like Louise Antony’s (2012) 
“perfect storm” model is broadly true, according to which a variety of different factors all 
affect philosophy, leading it to be a particularly severe site for underrepresentation. 
Implicit bias is just one of the factors that has been cited. However, it has been a 
rhetorically prominent factor. One reason for this is probably the excitement of 
philosophers about a deeply philosophically interesting notion that they have only 
relatively recently become aware of. A further reason has undoubtedly been the notable 
willingness of universities and departments to consider implicit bias as an explanation of 
the underrepresentation and marginalization issues that they are beginning to 
recognize. Implicit bias has, in short, probably played a large role in these discussions 
simply because both universities and philosophy departments have been especially 
receptive to this form of evidence (as opposed to, say, testimonial evidence from 
members of marginalized groups—which was available long before research on implicit 
bias came on the scene).7 
 
2. IMPLICIT BIAS 
 
What is implicit bias? While the concept has affinities with various ways of identifying 
subtle or unintended discrimination that predate the recent research programs of social 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the descriptions from Anita Allen, in her interview with George Yancy, of the sorts of 
hostile environment she faces as a black woman in philosophy. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/opinion/black-women-in- philosophy.html. See also testimonies 
submitted to What is it Like to be a Person of Color in Philosophy blog 
(https://beingaphilosopherofcolor.wordpress.com) and some of those submitted to the What is it Like to 
be a Woman in Philosophy blog, such as this one: 
https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2017/08/24/online-discussion-of-diversity-hires/. 




psychology, the term has been coined to capture a series of results drawn from studies 
involving indirect measures. Such measures do not rely on directly asking people to 
report on their attitudes, on the assumption that people will not report on some aspects 
of their cognition either because they are unaware of them, or because they are 
unwilling to reveal them. The most well-known and often used indirect measure is the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT), first developed in 1995 (Greenwald et al. 1998). This test 
measures the strength of associations between concepts or evaluations and social 
groups.8 For example, a gender stereotype IAT can evaluate how strongly participants 
associate men and women with certain stereotypes to do with leadership or supporting 
roles, respectively (Dasgupta and Asgari 2004). A race evaluative IAT can evaluate how 
strongly white or black people are associated with positive or negative evaluations, 
respectively (Olson and Fazio 2006).9 (IATs have been used to evaluate different 
stereotypical associations – different stereotypes associated with race and gender, as 
well as with other social categories, and likewise different sorts of evaluation. Other 
indirect measures include Affect Misattribution Procedure, Sequential Priming 
Measures, and Go/No-Go Attribution Tasks.10) Indirect measures have been used to 
identify different stereotypical and evaluative associations that participants hold relating 
to social groups including race, gender, age, disability, sexuality, size. The stereotypical 
or evaluative associations that are revealed on indirect measures such as the IAT are 
what are referred to as implicit biases. What is distinctive of implicit biases is that they 
                                                 
8 The IAT has also been used to test associations between target concepts that are not to do with social 
groups, e.g., with brand associations. 
9 See Goff and Kahn (2013) and our discussion below for concerns that such studies are likely accessing 
gender stereotypes associated with white women and evaluations associated with black men, rather than 
with women and black people in general. 
10 For a useful summary of these different measures, see Michael Brownstein, “Implicit Bias,” The 




may not be available to individuals to report on; indeed, they may be in conflict with the 
agent’s endorsed values and beliefs. Moreover, they are difficult to get rid of, and their 
influence on action can be difficult to control. 
 That our minds might encode such cognitions is troubling. More so the putative 
relationship with behavior. Studies have attempted to show that the presence of implicit 
biases (as measured by IATs or other indirect measures) correlates with behavioral 
tendencies. For example, a study examining implicit bias in medical practitioners found 
that to the extent that doctors had implicit biases against black people, the doctors 
tended not to prescribe treatment for black patients—patients whose described 
symptoms were the same as those of white patients for whom they did make 
prescription recommendations (Green et al. 2007). In a study on gender bias, Carlana 
(2018) found that the extent to which teachers had implicit gender biases—associating 
maths more strongly with men than women—correlated with classroom behaviors, such 
as expressions that affect girls’ self-confidence, or fewer interactions with girl students—
that led to differential outcomes for boys and girls in the classroom. To the extent that 
teachers had implicit gender biases about maths, girls’ improvement was markedly less 
than that of boys in their class. Moreover, in a recent statistical analysis, Greenwald et 
al. suggest that implicit biases might have significant behavioral impact when their 
effects are considered across large groups (2015, 558). It is this putative relationship 
between implicit biases and behavior that has made compelling the suggestion that 
implicit biases might be part of the explanation for the persisting underrepresentation 
and marginalization of multiple groups in philosophy, and that measures, such as some 
of those described below, should be taken to guard against implicit biases affecting our 





3. PHILOSOPHICAL REFORM EFFORTS AND THEIR MANY JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
Some efforts to reform the profession are very obviously not justified via implicit bias. 
The clearest case of this is reforms aimed at eliminating sexual harassment in 
philosophy. While it is entirely possible that implicit bias plays a role in perpetuating this 
problem (e.g., by leading people to find members of marginalized groups less credible 
than members of dominant groups), this is no part of the justification for doing 
something about sexual harassment. We will set aside cases like these and focus 
instead on reforms that seem more plausibly to depend for their justification on data 
about implicit bias. 
 
3.1 ANONYMIZING: MARKING, HIRING, PUBLICATION 
 
3.1.1 THE MANY REASONS FOR ANONYMIZING 
 
Research on implicit bias is often used in arguing for anonymization. It is easy to see 
why: if we are likely to be influenced by implicit biases based on categories like gender 
and race—which can often be readily discerned from a name—it would be a good idea 
to keep us from seeing those names when we are making important decisions as we do 
in marking, hiring, and refereeing. Studies of CVs have shown a tendency to see the 
same CV as better with a typically white or male name (rather than a typically nonwhite 
or female name), and some of these have shown that this tendency correlates with 
implicit bias levels (see, e.g., Rooth 2010).1112 
                                                 
11 See also the study on CVs from Moss-Racusin et al. (2012)—but note the claim about gender bias 
there is based on the use of the Modern Sexism Scale, which is a self-report scale, albeit one that is more 




 Anonymyzing (when it succeeds) would make it impossible for these biases to 
operate. Anonymous marking is simple enough to implement, and a near-universal 
practice in United Kingdom undergraduate marking (though obviously less successful in 
very small classes, or where markers also look at drafts). 
 Anonymous review at journals is fairly widely practiced, especially in philosophy. 
Fully anonymous appointment procedures for academic posts are harder, but some 
departments have anonymized at least one phase of the process—initial review of CVs, 
reading of writing samples, etc.13 Anonymization works by concealing names, which 
may reveal not only gender but also sometimes nationality, racial group, or religion. This 
means that it is effective as a means of combatting (though obviously not eliminating) 
discrimination that might occur due to multiple dimensions of identity. 
 It might seem that the case for anonymization stands or falls with the literature on 
implicit biases. But this case in fact remains strong even if it is not based on implicit bias 
research. 
                                                                                                                                                             
measure than the IAT. As a result, Moss-Racusin et al. refer to subtle bias, rather than implicit bias—the 
extent to which such subtle bias is co-extensive with explicit or implicit bias is an open and interesting 
question.  
12 There have been criticisms of the idea that implicit gender bias works against women, in real world 
hiring situations. In particular Williams and Ceci (2015) argued that these preferences actually work in 
women’s favor. However, their study focused exclusively on outstanding candidates. We have known for 
some time that biases are more likely to affect judgments in more borderline cases, and their work does 
nothing to undermine this. For further criticism of Williams and Ceci, see Brownstein (2015). Advancing a 
supplementary line of critique, Hermanson (2017) suggests that all cases of tenure-track hiring involve 
competition exclusively between outstanding candidates. But this is a puzzling suggestion. While it 
certainly is true that anyone who has acquired a philosophy PhD is outstandingly good at philosophy, it is 
still the case that (for example) the applicants with large numbers of publications in “top” journals are 
outstanding as compared to those with no or fewer publications. Insofar as hiring processes in philosophy 
include a range of candidates, it makes sense to suppose (contra Hermanson) that there will be 
categories of ‘outstanding’ and ‘borderline’ in any search. (We are actually skeptics about the idea of 
these top journals genuinely being better, but nonetheless we can recognize that CVs which contain 
publications in them are generally viewed as outstanding.) 
13 For example, Sheffield used anonymity to review CVs and cover letters in the longlisting process, then 





 Many studies that show differential evaluations of CVs (Steinpreis et al. 1999; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004) are not studies of implicit bias.14 They demonstrate 
that the same CV is judged differently depending on the name, but they do not make 
any effort to discern whether this is correlated with implicit bias. It is often assumed that 
the differential judgments observed in all of these studies are due to implicit biases. If, 
however, we came to doubt the influence of implicit bias on our judgments, we would 
still need to reckon with all of these studies. They would still show that our judgments 
are influenced by the perceived race and gender of the person we are judging. The 
most likely explanation of this, would be explicit bias. We would clearly also want to 
eliminate the influence of this, and anonymizing would still be a good technique to use. 
 Studies of bias and anonymization in marking, journal article review,15 conference 
abstract submission16 and grant review17 are not entirely conclusive. This is an 
enormous and complex literature, so to get some sense of the complexity we will take a 
look at anonymization of marking. Bradley (1984, 1993) showed women at university to 
get higher marks under anonymous marking, which led to widespread assumptions that 
implicit marker bias was the cause of the initial lower marks. Hinton and Higson (2017) 
complicated this picture. Their large study of marking before and after the introduction of 
anonymous marking showed a small but significant narrowing of the achievement gaps 
                                                 
14 This is not true of all of them, however. For example, Rooth (2010) found that callbacks of candidates 
with Arab-sounding names were negatively correlated with implicit stereotyping. 
15 Budden et al. (2008) appeared to show a substantial increase in women’s publication rates after a 
journal instituted anonymous review. But this study has been criticized by Engqvist and Frommen (2008); 
Webb, O’Hara, and Freckleton (2008); and Whittaker (2008). 
16 Knobloch-Westerwick et al. (2013) asked subjects to review identical abstracts, accompanied by male 
and female names. They found a bias in favor of the “male” abstracts, particularly on stereotypically male 
topics. 
17 Wenneras and Wold (1997) found that female grant applicants needed to be more than twice as 
productive as male grant applicants to achieve success. However, subsequent studies have not shown 
this effect (see Lee et al. 2013 for a review of these). This may be due to measures put in place to 




between groups after anonymity was introduced. However, this same narrowing was 
present for oral examinations, which were not anonymized. This casts doubt, at least in 
this case, on the thought that implicit bias in markers was responsible for the gap before 
the introduction of anonymity. The authors note that students’ perception of greater 
procedural justice might instead be responsible for the change. In our view, this only 
enhances the case for anonymous marking: if there are marking biases to be blocked 
(implicit or explicit), anonymous marking is good. And even if there are not such biases, 
anonymous marking will reduce achievement gaps by creating a manifestly more 
procedurally just system. 
 Although much attention in this literature has focused on gender and race biases, 
there is very good evidence of other biases playing a significant role in academic hiring 
and review processes. In particular there is substantial evidence for nationality biases; 
and biases against non-native speakers of English.18 There is also good evidence of 
affiliation bias, in which reviewers favor those with whom they have relationships.19 To 
the extent that members of marginalized groups are less likely to be integrated into 
professional networks, this will work against such people. Finally prestige bias (favoring 
work that appears to have been written at a prestigious institution, people who work at 
such an institution, or people with other markers of prestige) is well established. Since 
members of marginalized groups may be less likely to have these markers of prestige, 
this will also disproportionately affect members of these groups.20  
 Perhaps the most important justification for anonymization, however, does not 
actually depend on any empirical results. Instead, it’s the result of asking “why not 
                                                 
18 For a good review of this evidence, see Lee et al. 2013. 
19 Again, Lee et al. 2013 provides an overview. 
20 Classic papers on this include Merton 1968 and Peters and Ceci 1982, but see Lee et al. 2013 for an 




anonymize?” If you think that judgments of quality of work or job candidate should be 
influenced just by the quality of that work or job candidate, why on earth would you want 
to have irrelevant information? We know enough by now, surely, to know that we are 
often influenced by things that we think shouldn’t influence us. (And even if you think 
that you yourself are not influenced in this way, you undoubtedly know others who 
are.)21 Removing the possibility of those influences, then, is surely a good thing. Unless 
one thinks that gender or race actually is relevant to these decisions, it is difficult to 
oppose anonymization.2223 
 
3.1.2 ANOYNMIZING AND INTERSECTIONALITY 
 
While anonymization will deal (to some extent) with discrimination that may occur along 
multiple dimensions (e.g., race, gender, and class—insofar as these are identifiable on 
applications or publications), it is true that it is nonetheless limited in the ways captured 
by Crenshaw’s ‘basement’ analogy. As she describes it, the basement contains people 
who are disadvantaged, sometimes along multiple dimensions. The ceiling is actually 
the floor of an upper room, in which privileged people reside. As Crenshaw writes: “in 
efforts to correct some aspects of domination, those above the ceiling admit from the 
basement those who can say that ‘but for’ the ceiling they too would be in the upper 
room” (1989, 151) . Access, however, is generally available only to those who, while 
                                                 
21 Note also that evidence shows that confidence in one’s own objectivity correlates with being more 
biased (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007). 
22 Of course, there may be some cases where gender or race is relevant to hiring decisions, such as in 
instances where one seeks to contextualize achievements or practice affirmative action. We discuss 
these cases below. 
23 There are, however, potential difficulties with anonymous marking when it comes to provision of certain 
sorts of feedback to students. Pre-submission comments on drafts, for example, compromise anonymity, 
as do other feedback methods that are intended to engage students in a dialogue with lecturers. 
Moreover, see Pitt and Winstone (2018) for the concern that anonymity might on some occasions affect 
student perceptions of the quality of relationship with their lecturers. It is possible that these concerns 
could give one reason not to anonymize under certain circumstances—perhaps with purely formative 




disadvantaged, are relatively privileged. Those who are multiply disadvantaged, 
experiencing oppression along many dimensions, are typically too far below to benefit 
from the access hatch to the upper room. Crenshaw’s point is that to address some 
forms of intersectional oppression, more structural changes are needed than simply 
removing the discrimination that would not be experienced but for (typically) one aspect 
of identity (see also p. 144).24 Anonymizing is the sort of reform that helps those who 
have, despite the many forces working against them, reached the same level of 
achievement as those from more privileged groups. But these will for the most part be 
those who are relatively privileged among marginalized group members. To fight 
intersectional oppression more fully requires structural changes that go well beyond 
anonymizing. Some of the reforms we outline below move toward more structural 
changes. Thus, we think it important to recognize that while anonymity is important, it is 
a limited strategy and other reforms are also needed to address exclusion. 
 
3.2 OTHER HIRING REFORMS 
 
There are a wide variety of reforms to hiring practices that have been suggested. We 
now turn to ones other than anonymity. 
• Affirmative action: the most popularly suggested form of affirmative action is 
giving application materials from members of marginalized groups an additional 
look.25 While concerns about implicit bias are one justification for this, there are 
many others. An obvious alternative justification would be explicit bias (though in 
that case, an additional look may be unlikely to remedy things). But there are 
also other reasons: Members of marginalized groups are likely to be less well 
mentored26 so their materials may not be as polished as those of people who 
                                                 
24 Note that Crenshaw’s target is primarily the framework operative in antidiscrimination law, but she 
extends her critique to feminist thinkers more broadly also (1989, 150). 
25 Obviously, this is incompatible with a wholly anonymous procedure. But one could very well do this at 
the longlisting stage, and then ensure that writing samples are read anonymously. 
26 Moss-Racusin et al. (2012) found that participants reviewing the same CVs assigned to male or female 




have received better mentoring. They are likely to have encountered more 
obstacles, in the form of explicit bias and hostile environments, meaning the 
same level of achievement may have been more difficult for them than for 
members of overrepresented groups. Finally, there is some evidence that 
members of marginalized groups may tend to write on topics that are lower 
status.27 Unless one thinks this status hierarchy is correct, it is a further reason to 
give these applications an additional look. 
 
• Agreeing on hiring criteria in advance, considering specific issues 
separately, and taking time over decisions, while not putting excessive weight on 
any one part of the process: All of these are ways to move away from a quick gut 
reaction to a more considered view, arrived at in light of clear criteria. While 
these help with implicit bias, they are also helpful in making sure that decisions 
are carefully reasoned, and justifiable in light of agreed criteria. It is difficult to 
see how this could be resisted, even by an implicit bias skeptic. 
 
• Reduce role of letters of reference. Research on letters of reference reveals 
some disturbing patterns, which have led some philosophical reformers to 
advocate reducing their role in hiring. However, this research is compatible with 
mechanisms other than implicit bias producing these patterns. Madera et al. 
(2009) showed that letters for women were more likely to use “communal” 
adjectives (e.g., ‘helpful’), while those for men were more likely to use “agentive” 
adjectives (e.g., ‘ambitious’), and that references with agentive adjectives were 
viewed more positively. Dutt et al. (2016) shows that women are only half as 
likely to receive excellent rather than good letters as measured by tone. They 
also found that—to the surprise of nobody who has ever been on a hiring 
committee—reference letters from those at institutions in the Americas are 
substantially longer than those from elsewhere.28 The international variations go 
beyond this however. In some European countries, applicants write their own 
letters which are then merely signed by the letter ‘writer’, a feature of which 
readers outside these countries are generally unaware. And most British 
academics will readily accept that their national tendency to understatement 
makes their references less glowing than those from the US, though we have yet 
to see empirical data on this. Phenomena like these are not remedied by 
anonymization, which is why a case can be made for reducing or eliminating 
references’ role in hiring. Importantly, none of this case hinges on the presence 
or absence of implicit bias in letter writing. We might suppose that implicit bias 
contributes to the differential style of letter writing for men and women, but this is 
only one explanation. Indeed, none of the studies mentioned tests whether the 
biases and variations involved are implicit or explicit. But the evidence for these 
variations is substantial, and it counts strongly for reform. 
                                                 
27 According to Botts et al. (2014), the top 5 areas for black philosophers are Africana, race, social and 
political, ethics, and continental. According to Haslanger (2009), the top 5 areas are feminist philosophy, 
applied ethics, normative ethics, social philosophy, and political philosophy. 
28 The Dutt study was international, so shows gendered patterns in a range of contexts. However, neither 
this study nor the Madera (2009) analyze how racial identity might interact with gender, so it is not clear 





• Snacks and breaks: decision making is better when people are well rested 
and well fed. This also reduces implicit bias, but surely better decisions and less 
cranky decision makers are justification enough.29 
 
These strategies, like anonymity, will lead to better decision making, and thereby go 
some distance toward addressing intersectional concerns. But they are likewise 
somewhat limited in scope. It is important to note, however, that the first suggestion 
(about affirmative action) makes room for the thought that members of marginalized 
groups may appear to be less well qualified if we simply apply the criteria we have 
already applied. It recognizes that if people have been encouraged less, or mentored 
less, or encountered more obstacles, they will appear to be less promising than they 
actually are. This suggestion, then, is not simply one of leveling the playing field. It is 
also a call to acknowledge the many ways in which the playing field is not level—and 
this has the potential to better address some of these concerns. 
 
3.3 RUNNING DISCUSSIONS DIFFERENTLY 
 
In many places, philosophical discussions (both in classrooms and at seminars and 
conferences) are understood as battles of sorts. Very commonly, the goal at 
departmental seminars has been (sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly) to destroy 
the speaker. Also commonly, a few high-status voices tend to dominate, with multipart 
questions and endless follow-ups. These sorts of discussion norms have been the 
subject of critiques for some time (Moulton 1983; Rooney 2009; Beebee 2013; Saul 
2013). Reforms commonly suggested include (a) encouraging the idea that the goal 
                                                 
29 One of the most compelling pieces of evidence in favor of snack breaks is provided by S. Danziger et 
al. (2011), suggesting that judges make harsher decisions immediately before lunch and snack breaks. 
This study has been criticized: Glöckner (2016) has suggested that part of this variation is susceptible to 




should be philosophical progress rather than victory; (b) instituting a one-question per 
question rule; (c) giving precedence to those who have not yet spoken. In teaching, a 
common suggestion is to have explicit discussions with students, in which they propose 
and discuss rules for productive discussion. 
 Implicit bias sometimes plays a role in justifying these reforms—after all, it may 
contribute to overlooking voices from marginalized groups or to favoring the high status. 
It can also lead to some men’s verbal aggression being viewed favorably and women’s 
unfavorably. (See, for example, Antony [2012] on the ‘double bind’ women face 
because arguing like a “good philosopher” clashes with norms for being a good 
woman.) Moreover, note that certain behaviors from white men may be tolerated but 
may not be from black men, whose behavior is instead regarded as intolerably 
aggressive (Duncan 1976). Evidence from various workplaces (including universities) 
suggests black women’s assertive behavior may also be penalized in distinctive ways, 
with the ‘angry black woman’ stereotype always looming (Williams 2014, 201–2). So not 
only are the ‘battle’ norms not conducive to discussion; they also may be applied with 
double standards to perpetuate further exclusions. Evidence of implicit bias, then, is not 
needed to justify reforms: if one’s goal is to do good philosophy, destroying every 
speaker is a perverse way of going about it. Encouraging, and making it comfortable, for 
more people to speak makes discussions more interesting and productive. And students 
benefit greatly from reflecting on how to have useful discussions. 
 Working together toward norms that are maximally inclusive—especially since 
discussion is such an integral part of our discipline—moves toward the sort of structural 
change we emphasized as important above. (However, it is worth noting that this 




some level engaged in its discussions. Where there is already underrepresentation at 
the early stages of disciplinary participation, it is not clear that this strategy will remedy 
that.) 
 
3.4 WORK HARDER TO NOTICE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
There are lots of data, both empirical and anecdotal, showing that contributions from 
members of marginalized groups often go unnoticed. Famously, women in meetings 
have their points ignored until they are repeated by (and often attributed to) a man (the 
phenomenon of ‘hepeating’ as it has become known. See also McClean et al. 2018 for 
research showing the different reception that men and women’s contributions receive). 
Excellent work by members of marginalized groups rarely makes it into introductory 
anthologies or onto syllabi (Thompson et al. 2016). Women are cited less than men 
(Healey 2015; Maliniak et al. 2013). And, of course, there are still a lot of conferences 
with all-male lineups of invited speakers30; more yet with all white lineups.  
 It’s commonly thought that implicit bias is an important cause of these phenomena. 
But we don’t really know this—as far as we know, there haven’t been any studies 
showing (for example) a correlation between the phenomena just mentioned and IAT 
scores. All we know is that these forms of overlooking exist. If it were to turn out that 
implicit bias isn’t a causal factor in these phenomena, it would still be the case that 
these forms of overlooking exist—but we would need other explanations for them. 
These are readily available in the form of explicit bias, both against social groups and 
against particular topics or approaches. But there are also historical explanations, for 
                                                 





example, for not putting women in introductory anthologies—women have not 
traditionally been a part of the canon,32 and introductory anthologies often simply draw 
on the inherited canon. 
 Even if we became convinced, then, that implicit bias did not cause these 
phenomena, we would still believe that the phenonema exist. And we would still want to 
do something about it—it is better not to overlook good work, and where there’s a 
systematic tendency to overlook good work from members of particular groups that’s 
unjust. People deserve credit for their ideas, so trying hard to notice contributions in 
meetings and to cite relevant work should be uncontroversial proposals. Moreover, 
there is reason to believe that seeing members of marginalized groups taken seriously 
as experts helps members of those groups to succeed, and this research in no way 
depends on results regarding implicit bias.33 The solution suggested—try harder to 
notice contributions—will be equally effective even if the not-noticing stems from a 
cause other than implicit bias. 
 Again, these kinds of changes—to what and who is included in debates and on 
curricula—moves toward the sorts of structural changes that are needed to be more 
thoroughly inclusive; though in order to do this, the inclusion needs to be more than 
merely ‘tokenistic’. 
 
                                                 
32 Though see O’Neill (1997) on the extent to which early modern women were a part of the mainstream 
in their own time, only to be dropped from the canon later. This may well have been true for other groups 
and times. 
33 Dasgupta (2011) argues that members of underrepresented groups who are experts may serve as a 
kind of “stereotype inoculation” that helps members of those groups to succeed. Her focus is on contact 
with those experts (as lecturers/professors), so it does not provide conclusive support for the idea that 





3.5 DIVERSIFYING READING LISTS, CONFERENCE LINEUPS, ANTHOLOGIES, 
VISITING SPEAKER SERIES 
 
This point has already been touched on above, since leaving people out of reading lists 
and conference lineups is a way of overlooking their contributions. But the solution of 
actively working to diversify reading lists, conference lineups, anthologies, and speaker 
series is controversial enough to merit separate discussion. Moreover, there are 
multiple kinds of diversity that may be at stake. Here we touch on just two. 
 
3.5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY 
 
The push for demographic diversity is for more members of marginalized groups. One 
of the efforts in this domain is the Gendered Conference Campaign, which calls 
attention to conferences with all-male invited speakers in the hope of encouraging 
people to avoid this. But there are also plenty of other efforts along these lines. The 
BPA/SWIP guidelines, for example, call for diversifying reading lists (their focus is 
specifically on gender, but some departments have adopted a broader version), and for 
trying to avoid all-male lineups of speakers. There are now some wonderful online 
resources to promote the diversification of invited speakers and reading lists, such as 
the Diversity Reading List (https://diversityreadinglist.org) and the UP Directory 
(https://updirectory.apaonline.org). Although implicit bias is often cited as an explanation 
for the current lack of diversity, in reality the problem is the lack of diversity—and the 
problem remains whether it is caused by implicit bias, explicit bias, structural factors, or 
all of these things. Implicit bias comes into justifications that focus on the potential 
effects of diversifying: the presence of counterstereotypical exemplars (members of the 
stereotyped group who don’t fit the stereotype) can help to reduce implicit bias. But 




demographically helps to increase the sense of belonging of people from marginalized 
groups (Dasgupta 2011); and that reaching a critical mass of people from 
underrepresented groups can improve the accuracy of judgments (Stewart and Valian 
2018, ch. 5). Moreover, once we acknowledge the intersectional nature of oppression, it 
is clear that just adding women to reading lists is insufficient. Instead, it becomes vital to 
consider all the dimensions of demographic diversity, and to work to improve on as 
many as are reasonably possible. 
 
3.5.2 DIVERSITY OF SUBJECT MATTER 
 
Another important reform is to diversify in terms of subject matter: instead of simply 
teaching canonical issues, this line of argument goes, it is important to teach issues 
such as gender, race, class, and disability: ones that have traditionally been neglected 
in philosophy. This reform is generally not justified in terms of implicit bias, though a 
case could be made that implicit bias has played a role in the neglect of these issues—
for example, by causing members of the profession to take those who raise them 
(generally members of marginalized groups) less seriously. Generally, this reform is 
justified on straightforwardly philosophical grounds. 
 Take, for example, the remarkable absence of discussions of racial justice in the 
mainstream philosophical literature on justice, until very recently. Proponents of 
nonideal theory like Charles Mills (2005) argue that attempting to theorize justice 
without attention to real-world injustice leads to serious errors and omissions. And these 
go unremarked and unnoticed, because of lack of attention to these issues. He notes 
that not only does Rawls fail to discuss racial injustice except in passing, but that until 




Nozick’s immensely influential libertarian theory has startling consequences of modern-
day property rights if one considers the immense historical violations of Native American 
property rights—but this too went largely unremarked for some time. In some instances, 
what has been left out is not unrelated to who has been left out, as Charles Mills 
suggests; only from a position of white ignorance could ignoring racial injustice be 
possible. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that ignoring issues of racial injustice 
impoverishes philosophical discussion of central topics like justice. Once more, this 
argument has nothing to do with implicit bias.34  
 
3.6 REJECT “GENIUS” IDEAL 
 
A recently popular suggestion in philosophy has been to work to rid ourselves of the 
“genius” ideal, according to which philosophical insight and success comes from a fixed 
innate ability. Some (such as Schwitzgebel 2010 and Saul 2013) have suggested that 
philosophers’ views about who “seems smart” are influenced by implicit biases. But the 
main empirical evidence for rejecting the genius ideal is the work of Leslie et al. (2015), 
which examines the extent to which members of a field take success to be due to an 
innate ability, and the extent to which women and black people are underrepresented. 
They found a significant correlation between these: the fields in which success was 
most thought to be due to innate ability were also the fields in which women and black 
people were most underrepresented.35  
 
                                                 
34 Note that the call to include diverse subject matter is sometimes presented as a matter of ‘intellectual 
diversity’. For concerns with this framing, see Dotson 2018. 
35 It isn’t clear, from their analyses and report, how the intersection of gender and race applies here, that 
is, whether beliefs about the causes of success interact with the representation of white women or black 





3.7 MENTORING SCHEMES, SUMMER SCHOOLS 
 
As noted a few times above, members of marginalized groups will often have received 
less mentoring and support than others. Several important sorts of programs have come 
into existence to attempt to address this. 
• Programs like PIKSI and Rutgers Summer School for Diversity in 
Philosophy offer summer schools for promising undergraduate members of 
marginalized groups who are considering postgraduate work in philosophy. They 
get mentoring from both senior members of the profession and current PhD 
students, and meet other marginalized students considering philosophy. 
 
• Mentoring workshops like the one-off SWIP UK mentoring workshop, or the 
regular Mentoring workshops run by the Mentoring Project in the US, offer early 
career women the mentoring support of senior women, along with the chance to 
spend time with other women of their own cohort. 
 
• SWIP UK’s mentoring program works differently, pairing junior women (from 
postgraduates on) with senior members of the profession of any gender for 
mentoring support, tailored to the particular requests from the junior women. 
 
These programs are not justified by invoking implicit bias, even though implicit bias may 
of course be a factor in the lack of mentoring that members of marginalized groups 
receive. Rather, they are initially justified by noting that members of these groups 
receive less mentoring and want more mentoring; and their continuation is justified by 
the testimonies of those who have participated. These programs—especially ones that 
focus on multiple intersectional categories like PIKSI and Rutgers—are especially well 
suited to addressing the problems pointed to by Crenshaw’s basement analogy. 
 
3.8 INDIVIDUAL BIAS-REDUCTION TECHNIQUES 
 
Some reform proposals have specifically focused on reducing implicit biases. These 
draw on research from social psychology, where interventions to reduce implicit bias 




that individuals might do in order to change or reduce the extent to which they harbor 
implicit biases (with the hope that reducing bias is then reflected in behavior—an issue 
we take up in section 4.3 below). One such intervention focuses on ‘implementation 
intentions’: intentions to think counterstereotypical thoughts cued to particular contexts 
(such as ‘if I am in a talk by a woman, I will think ‘competent’).36 Implicit bias training 
developed by Devine and colleagues (reported on in their 2012) asks participants to 
adopt a suite of strategies to try to reduce their own biases: stereotype replacement; 
counterstereotypic imagining; individuating (focusing on specific features, rather than 
group membership); perspective-taking (imagining what it is like for others); and 
increasing opportunities for contact with stigmatized group members. 
 Adopting such strategies seemed somewhat successful: participants who did so 
experienced a reduction in implicit bias on later IATs. They also showed greater 
concern about discrimination, and increased awareness of their own propensity for bias, 
at two months’ follow-up. This sounds like a good outcome—though note that a 2017 
replication of the study found similarly except, crucially, that there was little reduction in 
implicit bias (Forscher et al. 2017a). Still, raising awareness of propensity for bias and 
increasing concern for discrimination is not insignificant—after all, the greater an 
individual’s concern, the more likely she will adopt some of the reform strategies 
outlined above, one might think. However, it is not obvious that there is robust empirical 
                                                 
36 This strategy draws on research from Stewart and Payne (2008), who looked at implementation 
intentions concerned with stereotyping of black people (as it turns out, in this context the stereotypes 
target black men). The implementation intentions they focused on addressed ‘danger’ stereotypes: 




support for adopting individual bias reduction strategies. Nor is it obvious that these are 
where energies are best placed—as we shall see in the following sections.37 
 
3.9 IMPLICIT BIAS TRAINING 
 
A very widely adopted reform effort—not just within philosophy—is to institute implicit 
bias training. Such training typically constitutes a workshop aimed at raising awareness 
about implicit bias, and—to greater or lesser degrees—attention to what might be done 
to combat biases. It might seem obvious that the usefulness of this intervention 
depends on what the research about implicit bias shows, and it is certainly true that 
there is some relationship here: if we became convinced that implicit bias did not play 
any important role in marginalization and underrepresentation, or—at a further 
extreme—that it did not exist, it would be bizarre indeed to endorse something called 
‘implicit bias training’. However, it is worth noting that there are very many different 
kinds of things that go under the heading of ‘implicit bias training’. Some offer no 
suggestions at all for how to reduce the manifestation of implicit bias. As we’ll see in a 
later section, these trainings are by far the most problematic, as there is good empirical 
evidence that this kind of training should not be done. Others focus on individual bias 
reduction strategies, as discussed in section 3.8 (see, e.g., Devine et al. 2012). But the 
sort of training we both favor—and offer when we run training sessions—is very 
different from these. We favor implicit bias training on which implicit bias offers a useful 
way in to discussing the structural, institutional, and cultural factors that give rise to and 
perpetuate these biases. And although we do include some discussion of individual-
                                                 
37 Though see Madva 2017 for a robust defense of the value of institutionally sponsored programs of 




level remedies, we emphasize the importance of the sorts of much broader sorts of 
reforms we have been discussing in this portion of the paper.38 These reforms are not 
justified only in terms of implicit bias, so training that presents and argues for these 
reforms is multiply justified. Empirical concerns about implicit bias would certainly 
provide good reason for altering these training sessions (especially with respect to their 
names!), but much of the training would remain very well justified. 
 
4. THE SOURCES OF SKEPTICISM 
 
So far, we have argued that there remain good reasons to undertake various reforms 
irrespective of whether one relies on research from empirical psychology about implicit 
bias. One reason for which some may be reluctant to draw on such research is that 
there have recently been claims advanced that challenge the robustness of this 
research. Some of the concerns with research on implicit bias in fact targets just one of 
the methods that has been used to access implicit attitudes: the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT).39 This test measures how quickly people are able to make stereotype 
congruent or incongruent categorizations. (For example, categorizing men and 
leadership would be stereotype congruent; women and leadership, or men and 
supporter would be stereotype incongruent categorizations.) If, as is frequently found, 
people are able to respond more quickly in making stereotype congruent 
categorizations, it is inferred that those notions are more accessible, and hence more 
likely to be activated. When activated, biases may have an influencing role on judgment 
or behavior. Indeed, some studies have tried to show that to the extent that one has 
                                                 
38 For a fuller discussion of the ways that implicit bias training can be used to motivate structural and 
cultural reforms, see Saul (forthcoming). 




implicit biases of some kind, one is more likely to behave in discriminatory ways (Green 
et al. 2007). However, various critiques have been raised in relation to the research 
program using indirect measures such as the IAT. We set out, and defend against, 
these critiques below.40 So, we argue below, one should feel free to justify reforms by 
appealing to implicit bias; moreover, there can be some important gains from doing so. 
But since the reforms are not solely dependent on this research, this is not the only 
source of support for them. 
 
4.1 TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY 
 
Doubts have been raised about the reliability of the IAT. In short the worry is this: if the 
test is accessing some stable mental construct, then we would expect the test to yield 
the same results when people take it over time (unless there is reason to suppose some 
intervention has altered that stable attitude). But, people’s IAT ‘scores’ can vary from 
occasion to occasion on which they take it—there is low test-retest reliability. This 
suggests, it has been argued, either that the IAT does not measure some stable mental 
construct, or that, to the extent that there is such a construct, this tool is not one that 
reliably accesses it. 
 How strong a challenge is this? First, to the extent that there are other indirect 
measures that access implicit attitudes,41 it appears that the best interpretation of the 
challenge is to suppose that it targets the reliability of the tool (rather than the existence 
of any stable mental construct). So, is the IAT an unreliable tool? It is true that if you 
                                                 
40 For other responses to critiques of the IAT, see Jost (2018), Gawronski (2018), Brownstein, M., A. 
Madva, and B. Gawronski (ms), and Brownstein (ms). 
41 For example, consider an IAT that accesses associations between black and weapons. Other indirect 
measures have revealed these associations also, in particular sequential priming tasks (priming with a 
black rather than white face increases the frequency at which ambiguous objects are identified as guns) 




take a test one day, then take it again a week later, you might not get the same score. 
However, this is completely unsurprising, given that what is measured are fine-grained 
response times, and we know that these are influenced by lots of situational factors—
how tired you are, recent interactions, other beliefs and goals activated at the time you 
take the test. It is rare that all of these are held fixed across different occasions on 
which individuals participate in these measures (especially where participation is online, 
and the experimenters have no control over background conditions in which individuals 
participate). This fact has been known for some time, and it is a key part of the basis for 
bias-reduction techniques like those discussed in 3.6. 
 What conclusions, then, can be drawn from this? First, note that the performance 
of the IAT is not anomalous here. As Jost notes, “the IAT shows higher (within persons) 
test-retest reliability than other measures commonly used in psychological research, 
including Stroop and priming tasks” (2018, 2). Second, researchers who use the IAT are 
generally at pains to emphasize that the IAT is not diagnostic—it won’t tell us what an 
individual’s real level of bias is: indeed, the strength of association can change.42 
However, consider that results on large projects, such as those of Project Implicit, in 
which hundreds of thousands of people have participated, show certain patterns 
emerging notwithstanding variation in individual scores. People tend to have stronger 
negative associations with black rather than white people; people tend to associate men 
more strongly with science or leadership than they do women.43 These broad patterns 
of results include those from individuals whose scores have changed from time to time 
                                                 
42 It should be admitted, however, that those discussing the IAT sometimes write as though individuals 
have particular levels of implicit bias, rather than individuals at times or individuals in particular 
circumstances. Jennifer Saul is among those who have made this error, which she now regrets. 
43 Again, we note this with the caveat about the gendered assumptions about race, and racialized 





that the IATs have been taken. Notwithstanding this individual variation, the pattern of 
bias emerges, and this is where the real import of the research finding is. If large 
numbers of people all have even slight biases that tend in one direction, this could have 
a significant impact (see Greenwald et al. 2015 for a simulation to this effect). It has led 
Payne et al. (2017) to develop the Bias of Crowds model. They note that while implicit 
biases vary across time for individuals, they tend to stay stable across locations such as 
countries or cities, and to be correlated with levels of discrimination. According to the 
Bias of Crowds model, we should view implicit bias measurements more as 
measurements of situations than of individuals. Others propose a less radical model 
which nonetheless accounts for the ‘person in the situation’, or emphasizes the 
significance of ‘contextual factors’ (see Jost 2018 and Gawronski 2018, respectively) in 
the measurement of implicit bias.44 These models, which emphasize the importance of 
situational context, serve very well to justify many of the reforms discussed in section 3. 
In particular, they motivate the kinds of reforms to institutional procedures that we 
identified—more inclusive curricula, events, discussions, and departments, affirmative 
action in hiring, say—rather than any particular individual bias reduction strategy in the 
form of a ‘cognitive fix’. The focus on creating better environments is a way of taking 
seriously the ways in which the expression of biases seem to be heavily affected by 
context. These more structural changes acknowledge widespread nature of the problem 
and its environmental causes, and do not suppose that in each instance in which we 
might find bias there will also be an effective ‘cognitive fix’.45  
                                                 
44 Gawronski: “the available evidence suggests that contextual factors determine virtually every finding 
with implicit measures, including 1) their overall scores, 2) their temporal stability, 3) their prediction of 
future behavior, and 4) the effectiveness of interventions” (2018, 11). 
45 It should be also noted that the standards for test-retest reliability are not uncontroversial, and critics 





4.2 LACK OF PREDICTIVE VALIDITY 
 
A stronger source of concern focuses on the predictive validity of the IAT and other 
indirect measures. Predictive validity concerns the extent to which how one performs on 
a measure (such as the IAT) predicts how one will perform on other measures—of 
particular relevance here are behavioral measures such as interactions, judgments, or 
other tasks that manifest attitudes. Recent meta- analyses have suggested that even if 
the IAT (or other indirect measures) does reliably reveal some stable mental construct, 
that mental construct does not itself correlate with any particular behaviors that we 
might care about, such as discriminatory behaviors (Oswald et al. 2013). We think, 
however, that these concerns are misguided. One reason for this is that there are 
serious problems with the methodology of the meta-analysis; the other is that low 
predictive ability is not actually as worrying as others have made it out to be. 
 The methodological criticisms are those made by Greenwald et al. in their 
response to the Oswald meta-analysis. Greenwald et al. point out that the inclusion 
criteria used by Oswald et al.—namely, the grounds for including a study in the meta-
analysis—are seriously problematic. Oswald et al. looked at the relationship between 
bias and behavior on 46 studies concerning racial and ethnic biases. However, while 
some of these studies predicted behaviors, others of them were testing specifically to 
show that the results of the indirect measure did not predict a certain kind of behavior. 
For example, Oswald et al. include studies from Amodio and Devine (2006), who predict 
that an IAT that measures associations between race and stereotypes of intellectual 
abilities will predict judgments of competence, but that an evaluative IAT would not. 




individuals more generally, are instead predicted to correlate with warmth behaviors, 
rather than judgments of competence. It is a mistake to include the relationship between 
evaluative IATs and judgments of competence (or stereotype IATs and warmth 
behaviors) in a meta-analysis, since these studies were designed precisely to show that 
the measure does not correlate with some behaviors (while it does correlate with 
others). Yet Oswald et al. included such studies in their meta-analysis. When 
Greenwald et al. included in the analysis only studies where a relationship with behavior 
was expected, they found that predictive validity was considerably higher (.216, rather 
than .15). In other words: the predictive validity is much higher when the meta-analysis 
is confined to what was actually predicted. 
 Still, while higher than the original meta-analysis, psychologists would describe the 
predictive validity as ‘low’. Is this a worry? Greenwald et al. argue not—that small effect 
sizes can still be consequential, especially if the effects are found in large numbers of 
people. They use statistical modeling to demonstrate this. This is a very important point. 
However, we want to advance a different strategy to emphasize the importance of even 
low predictive validity.46  
 Our response starts by noting that few among us would think that the prevalence of 
explicitly sexist or racist beliefs are unproblematic, even if we learned that in particular 
cases they often don’t affect behavior. Instead, we’d quickly acknowledge that of course 
many factors have an effect on what behaviors people will manifest, and that these may 
mean that explicit beliefs don’t cause the behaviors we’d expect. And this is in fact just 
what we find. Across these same studies the predictive validity of explicit beliefs is also 
                                                 
46 See also Gawronski’s response to concerns about predictive validity: he suggests that there is no basis 




very low (.12). And this is not different from the general pattern for explicit beliefs—
models for predicting behavior have typically moved beyond appeal just to beliefs, since 
beliefs are seen to be poor predictors of behavior in a range of domains. For example, 
in the health sciences, where predicting healthy or risky behavior is important, various 
studies show the poverty of beliefs as predictors of behavior (see Abraham and 
Sheeran 2005 for an overview).47 
 This casts a different light on the low predictive validity of implicit biases—it is low, 
but so is the predictive validity of explicit beliefs, whose importance few would (or 
should) doubt. Even if beliefs are not (in some domains) good predictors of behavior, we 
still have reason to care about them. First, we might simply maintain that it is wrong or 
bad to have problematic (false, misleading, inaccurate, stereotyping …) cognitions. We 
might think this about explicit beliefs and implicit cognitions. Second, we might think that 
a further thing that is problematic about such cognitions is that they present the 
possibility or risk of being expressed or acted on. We might want to remove or reduce 
that risk, no matter how small. Moreover, the level of risk is going to be strongly 
influenced by contextual factors such as the opportunity to act on such cognitions, the 
encouragement to act on such cognitions, and the social and practical consequences of 
doing so (see, e.g., Duguid and Thomas-Hunt [2015] for evidence that people may be 
more likely to express bias when they believe it is normal to do so). This gives us an 
excellent reason to care about creating environments that will reduce the risk of these 
cognitions being expressed or acted on—which is one of the goals of the professional 
                                                 
47 In fact, some beliefs at least intuitively are better predictors of behavior. For example, my belief that the 
shop has closed will predict that I won’t take a detour to the shop on the way home; my belief that I will 
meet Alix at 10 a.m. is a good predictor of my turning up at the agreed location to meet her. Some beliefs 
appear to be good predictors of behavior, others bad; it is an interesting question, but one beyond the 





reforms discussed above. So these two reasons mean that we should care about 
implicit cognitions, even if the extent to which they predict behaviors is low. A third 
reason we might appeal to for caring about explicit beliefs is that we might assume that 
changes in beliefs will be accompanied by changes in behavior. However, this 
consideration takes us directly to the third concern to be addressed in the following 
section. 
 Finally, notice that the concern about predictive validity is focused on the extent to 
which the measures are predictive of individual behavior. But, as we have noted above, 
the best recent models of implicit bias focus on its effects as a group-level phenomenon 
(e.g. Payne et al.’s [2017] ‘Bias of Crowds’ model). As they point out, the relationship 
between patterns of implicit bias at group level, and the discriminatory behavior of that 
population, is more robust (7–8, 19). 
 To summarize the case so far: the predictive validity of implicit biases appears not 
to be as low as Oswald et al. initially claimed. But in any case, we have reason to care 
about implicit biases even if they are poor predictors of behavior, just as we may still 
care about explicit beliefs that are similarly poor predictors of behavior. Moreover, 
understood as a group-level phenomenon, the relationship with behavior is more robust. 
 
4.3 INEFFICACY OF BIAS CHANGE 
 
A further worry is that focusing attention on implicit biases is simply the wrong place to 
direct our efforts. In particular, this concern has force when one considers the results of 




changes in bias (Forscher et al. 2017b).48 In that case, why bother trying to change 
biases at all? 
 We think that it is right to embrace this concern about efforts to simply change 
biases. On the one hand, it is completely unsurprising. On the other, explicitly 
recognizing and acknowledging it helps us see where we might best place our efforts. In 
order to understand the force of this concern and its implications, it is again worth 
thinking about the role and relevance of changing cognitions in other contexts. Consider 
the health sciences, where much research focuses (inter alia) on how to get people to 
stick to their exercise regimes, take their medicines, quit smoking, use condoms, etc. It 
is well acknowledged that changing isolated cognitions alone is insufficient for robust 
behavioral change. Simply getting individuals to believe in, say, the importance of 
adhering to an exercise regime is notoriously inadequate for getting people to stick to it 
(an insight that no doubt resonates with much personal experience!) (see, e.g., 
Abraham and Sheeran 2005). Instead, strategies that involve putting in place 
environmental cues or props to help one stick to the exercise plan have better success. 
For example, people who signed up for text message reminders (‘time to exercise!’) did 
far better at sticking by their exercise regimes than those who simply thought it would be 
good to exercise (Prestwich et al. 2009). The upshot is: it is well known that changing 
behavior does not depend solely on changing cognitions, but on more creative 
strategies that get us to do what we otherwise can’t quite manage. Environmental and 
institutional interventions seem to be the most effective, as they help us to create 
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situations conducive to getting us to act in accordance with our all-things-considered 
values. 
 All this is to say: if studies show that changing behavior is not brought about just by 
changing biases, this just gives us reason to embrace the conclusion that our attention 
should not focus primarily or solely on changing or reducing implicit biases. This does 
not mean that implicit biases are not an important problem to address, but rather that 
addressing them shouldn’t (alone, or even primarily) take the form of reducing implicit 
biases.49 This is a welcome conclusion, since—as noted in section 4.3 above—there is 
little robust evidence on quite how to reduce biases in the mid- to long term (Forscher et 
al. 2017a, 2017b). And, indeed, with the exception of the ‘cognitive fixes’ discussed in 
3.8, the professional reforms suggested do not focus on changing or reducing biases. 
Instead, in the cases where they are related at all to implicit biases, they focus on 
changing our environments. 
 As it turns out, then, reform strategies such as those considered in sections 3.1–
3.7 are not only multiply justified—good practice independently of concerns about 
implicit bias—they also look like the best strategies for responding to concerns about 
implicit bias. 
 
4.4 CONCERNS SPECIFICALLY ABOUT IMPLICIT BIAS TRAINING 
 
There is research that has been taken to cast doubt on the efficacy of implicit bias 
training; indeed some of this research has been taken to show that implicit bias training 
is counterproductive. We think this is absolutely right for some forms of implicit bias 
                                                 
49 For example, changing biases might be a necessary but insufficient part of changing behavior. This is 
consistent with the claim that we should not focus just on changing biases, but on changing 





training. But we think there is no evidence against other forms of implicit bias training, 
and also that there is good reason to think they could be helpful. Let’s begin by looking 
at a bit of this research. 
 Critics of implicit bias training often cite Duguid and Thomas-Hunt (2015). The key 
finding that is taken to undermine implicit bias training is presence of a moral licensing 
effect from learning that implicit bias is widespread: those who are told just this become 
more likely to make stereotypical judgments.50 If this is right—and there’s no reason to 
think that it isn’t—then any implicit bias training that simply tells people that implicit bias 
training is widespread is counterproductive. We agree wholeheartedly with this, and we 
consider it an enormous mistake to offer implicit bias training of this kind.51 Anecdotal 
reports suggest that this sort of training is quite widespread, and if that’s right then it is 
something that really needs to change.52  
 Importantly, however, not all training is like this. Some training specifically focuses 
on the importance of combatting implicit biases. For example, Devine et al. (2012) 
tested training that offered participants a suite of individual techniques for reducing 
implicit bias and found this to be effective in reducing bias, and increasing reported 
levels of concern about implicit bias. 53 However, a replication of this study with a much 
larger sample failed to show the training to have an impact on implicit biases (Forscher 
et al. 2017a). A more recent study (Carnes et al. 2015) has also raised some questions 
                                                 
50 Interestingly, the same study shows that if people are instead told that most people attempt to 
overcome their implicit biases, they are less likely to make stereotypical judgments. 
51 Saul (forthcoming) argues that this sort of training is analogous to a driver education course that merely 
teaches about the prevalence of accidents, without offering any methods for avoiding them. 
52 Anecdotal reports also suggest the prevalence of training in which people are told that they can 
overcome implicit bias by being objective. Uhlman and Cohen (2007) show that this is also likely to 
increase manifestation of implicit bias. There are also many reports of implicit bias training in which 
people are given guidance on how to overcome explicit bias, but no guidance on how to overcome implicit 
bias—but told that they have been trained in overcoming implicit bias. We would expect this to be 
counterproductive as well. 




about the efficacy of these individual bias-reduction techniques. At this point, there is 
conflicting evidence about the efficacy of well-run training that focuses on individual 
bias-reduction techniques. However, this is not the only kind of implicit bias training 
available, and we favor an alternative approach that does not depend for its success on 
showing that individual bias-reduction techniques are effective.  
 The sort of training we favor remains currently untested. Our preferred form of 
implicit bias training uses implicit bias as a way of motivating engagement with the ways 
that structures, institutions, and cultures can perpetuate marginalization and 
underrepresentation. We sketch a variety of institutional, cultural, and procedural 
changes that might be implemented but—most importantly—we invite participants to 
begin the process of reflecting on how their workplaces are organized and run. 
Crucially, we do not consider training to be completed at the end of one of these 
sessions. Instead, we urge participants to follow up with us to discuss ways that their 
specific processes can be improved; and they in fact do follow up with us at quite high 
rates. We know that this has very often led to substantial procedural changes in these 
workplaces. This sort of training has not yet been empirically tested, though we are in 
the early stages of a real-world study of this approach. 
 In short, there is very good empirical reason to reject certain forms of implicit bias 
training. But there is very good reason to continue to implement and explore other forms 
that look better positioned to bring about substantial changes in workplace practice and 
culture. 
 





Finally, an important concern is that the empirical research program on implicit bias has 
wholly failed to grapple with the realities of intersectional oppression. Indirect measures 
such as the IAT have focused on one dimension of identity—gender, or race, say—and 
have failed to recognize the distinctive forms of oppression that target the intersections 
of gender and race (and other aspects of social identity). Moreover, this failure is not 
simply one of omission; it also, it is argued, perpetuates oppression in producing 
“inaccurate understandings of racial and gender discrimination” (Goff and Kahn 2013), 
ones that serve to exclude women of color. 
 For example, Goff and Kahn point out that the stereotypes that are at issue in 
race/stereotype IATs (those to do with violence, aggression, criminality, as well as 
athleticism) are those typically associated with black men rather than black women 
(2013, 372). They note that where researchers are aware that racist stereotypes are 
gendered, “to the degree they must choose a gendered target, the tendency is to 
choose non-White men rather than non-White women” (ibid.). Moreover, there is 
evidence that ‘prototypical’ victims of gendered discrimination are white women (Goff 
and Kahn 2013, 376, confirming the claims in Crenshaw 1989, 1991). This suggests 
that when gender stereotypes are evaluated with indirect measures, what is activated in 
participants’ cognitions are stereotypes about white women, rather than women of color. 
This concern is compounded by testimonial reports (see, e.g., Williams 2014) that 
indicate that experiences of subtle bias reported by white women and women of color 
are qualitatively different. This means that the research program on implicit bias is 
skewed toward understanding gender bias in terms of biases white women face, and 
racial biases in terms of biases black men face. The specific biases or forms of 




other forms of oppression—class, disability, race, age—will not be accessed by indirect 
measures such as the IAT. This means that the field of research is particularly poorly 
placed to offer findings or interventions that are relevant to individuals facing oppression 
along multiple dimensions. 
 However, while this critique is certainly apt for the vast majority of the research on 
implicit bias, the failure of the research program to address intersectional oppression is 
a contingent rather than necessary feature. There is no reason that indirect measures 
could not be developed to address more than one dimension of oppression, or access 
the particular stereotypes that individuals in different social positions face. Indeed some 
recent work has started to examine more closely the intersection of different kinds of 
oppression, and the distinctive biases and stereotypes that are activated by 
intersectional identities. For example a few studies have started to use indirect 
measures to understand people’s prejudicial perceptions with respect to the relationship 
between race and class (Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2017; Lei and Bodehnausen 2017). 
Wilson and Remedios (2017) examined the biases that operate in the context of race 
and sexuality, finding that in some specific contexts, black gay men are stereotyped 
very differently from black straight men. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the biases did not 
seem to operate additively, but rather interacted in a more complex way, whereby 
associations with black gay men’s sexuality (warmth) tempered negative stereotypes 
associated with race (aggression). As far as we know, however, just one study has 
focused on indirect measures looking at the intersection of race and gender, and 
specifically whether stereotypes about danger and criminality are associated to the 




 The take-home message, then, is not that there is anything inherent in research on 
implicit bias that means the research tools are inapt for addressing intersecting 
oppressions—but that so far, they have largely failed to do so. The conclusions we can 
draw from existing studies on gender biases are most likely partial—about biases that 
white women face. The conclusions we can draw from existing studies on racial biases 
are likewise most likely about the biases that black men face. Overgeneralizations on 
the basis of these studies should be avoided, and we should note—and remedy—the 
paucity of research on implicit biases about black women, women from other racially 
stereotyped groups, and individuals marginalized due to other intersecting forms of 
oppression. Implicit biases are probably more complex than current research has 
supposed—tracking multiple intersecting dimensions of oppression, rather than just one 
dimension of identity (race, or gender, or …). The challenge, then, is to develop this 
research in ways that do not homogenize social groups and ignore importantly different 
ways in which individuals may be stereotyped. This does not give us a reason to reject 




We have considered four pressing challenges to the research program on implicit bias: 
about the reliability of the measures; about the predictive validity of implicit biases; 
about the inefficacy of bias change; and the failure to adequately address intersectional 
oppression. In engaging with these challenges, we get a better sense of how to 
understand the measures, about why we might care about implicit biases, as well as 
how we might best focus our efforts in understanding and addressing them. In short, we 




care about cognitions that have low predictive validity; that it is unsurprising that 
behavioral change is not mediated by changes in bias, given what is known elsewhere 
about how to bring about changes in behaviors. Moreover, there is reason to hope that 
future research can do better at addressing intersecting oppressions. 
 All this is to defend the research program on implicit bias from challenges, and 
establish that, in our view, it is legitimate to appeal to considerations about implicit bias 
to motivate reforms. Indeed, in the next section we set out some advantages of doing 
so. 
 
5. WHY TALK ABOUT IMPLICIT BIASES AT ALL? 
 
Since one could motivate many of the reforms without appeal to implicit bias (as 
outlined in section 3), and since one might have to deal with critiques such as those 
outlined in the previous sections, is there any reason to discuss implicit bias in this 
endeavor at all? In this section, we briefly point to reasons for which it may be 
efficacious to appeal to the research on implicit bias.55  
 First, appealing to considerations about implicit bias can be an effective tool for 
motivating people to consider reforms. One reason for this, perhaps, is that it makes 
clear that individuals—notwithstanding their good intentions—can be implicated in 
discrimination. Recognizing this, and that one may fail to live up to one’s egalitarian 
principles, can be a significant motivator. These concerns can be particularly gripping 
for philosophers, since we like to think of ourselves as objective. Being presented with 
                                                 





research that shows that we are, most likely, failing to live up to our self-conceptions is 
an important corrective to our lack of self-knowledge, and can be particularly motivating. 
 Second, proper understandings of implicit bias enable us to connect individual 
cognition with broader issues to do with social structures and social injustices (Saul 
forthcoming). It is important both to recognize implicit bias as caused, in part, by wider 
social structures; and to see implicit bias as playing a role in sustaining those social 
structures. Focusing on the relationship between individual cognition, social structures, 
and actions individuals can take to try to change those social structures, can be 
facilitated by discussions of implicit bias—if done well (ibid.). 
 Third, discussing implicit bias (in the right way) can be particularly useful for 
motivating robust institutional change. While it is true that many of the changes 
advocated in section 3 can be multiply justified, the importance of adopting these 
strategies is most forcefully seen, perhaps, when one considers the possibility of implicit 
bias affecting outcomes. Consider the recommendations for changing discussions 
outlined above. Putting in place rules that encourage constructive and inclusive 
discussion of course seems like a good idea from the points of view of simply being nice 
and getting good philosophy done. But the extent to which the recommended rules are 
needed—rather than just commitments to try and be nice, constructive, and inclusive—
is clearer once we consider the possibility of implicit bias. The research shows us that, 
most likely, goodwill alone will not get us there. Rules that remove discretion do a better 
job of combatting implicit bias. It’s great that they also show an institutional commitment 
to being constructive and addressing marginalization. 
 In sum: the reform proposals are multiply justified and don’t depend for their 




program can be defended in light of recent skeptical challenges. So, we should continue 
to push for reforms, and we can motivate these efforts by appealing to, inter alia, 
research on implicit bias. 
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